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Whether pointing at a menu item or rifling through a clothes rack, when we choose 
we often move. We investigated whether people’s tendency to copy the movements of others 
could influence their choices. Participants saw pairs of pictures in private and indicated which 
one they preferred. They then entered a virtual art gallery and saw the same pictures pairs in 
the presence of a virtual character. Having observed the virtual character point to indicate her 
preference with either a high or low movement trajectory, participants indicated their 
preference. There was either an anatomical (same movement, same choice) or spatial 
correspondence (same movement, different choice) between the participant’s pictures and 
those of the virtual character. We found that participants copied the movement made by the 
virtual character rather than her action goal (i.e. her choice of picture). This resulted in a shift 
towards the virtual character’s preferences in the anatomical condition but away from her 
preferences in the spatial condition. This effect was driven by the observation of the virtual 
character’s high pointing movements. In a further experiment, we did not find any significant 
differences in imitation behaviour in autism, although autistic participants were less 
consistent in their choices. Our findings demonstrate that we are not only influenced by 








Imagine you are at a restaurant with a friend and the waiter is taking your order. Your 
friend points emphatically at the menu indicating the particular meal she wants. When the 
waiter asks you what you want you point at the same item on the menu. Why did you make 
the same choice as your friend? 
Typical explanations offered by theories of social influence (e.g. Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004) stress your desire to affiliate with your friend and/or your belief that she has 
superior knowledge to you (perhaps she has been to the restaurant before). In support of this 
explanation a range of studies have demonstrated that our choices are influenced by our 
affiliative motives (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Midgley, Dowling, & Morrison, 1989) and by 
others’ perceived expertise (Lauring et al., 2016; Plassmann, O’Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 
2008). Yet, a limitation of these studies is that the social context is only implied (Berns, 
Capra, Moore, & Noussair, 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn, Bach, Roepstorff, Dolan, & Frith, 
2010; Plassmann et al., 2008). That is, although participants are informed of the choices of a 
particular person or group, they do not witness others indicating those preferences. However, 
as with you and your friend at the restaurant, people often move to indicate their preferences 
to others, or, as Schall (2001) highlighted “Often one does one thing (order a meal) by doing 
something else (point at the menu)” (Schall, 2001). 
Thus, it could be that when we observe others making choices, we are not only influenced by 
their choices (i.e. their action goal) but also the types of movements they make to indicate 
their choices. This is what we explored in the current study – when we make choices in the 
presence of others, are our choices influenced by the types of movements others make to 
indicate those choices?  This distinction between copying the choice (or goal) of an action 
compared to a particular movement maps onto an influential theory of imitation (Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Wohlschläger, Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003).  Thus, we place 
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our study of social influence in the context of motor studies of imitation, and consider what 
these might predict about people’s imitative tendencies. In the literature review below, we 
consider how people’s choices might be influenced by the goal of another’s action, by the 
topographical matching between the model and imitator’s action, and by social cues 
conveyed in the kinematics of the action.  In Experiment 1, we draw on these theories to 
build our hypothesis of how neurotypical people’s choices will be influenced by seeing 
another’s actions. In Experiment 2, we compared the imitation behaviour of autistic 
participants and a matched neurotypical group - autistic individuals have been shown to focus 
on goals during imitation (Hobson & Lee, 1999) and may show differences in their responses 
to social cues when modulating their imitation behaviour (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). 
Copying goals vs. copying kinematics  
The theory of goal-directed imitation (GOADI; Wohlschläger et al., 2003) states that 
during imitation people decompose an action into a hierarchy of goals in which the ends of an 
action (e.g. the particular item your friend pointed to on the menu) are further up the 
hierarchy than the means (e.g. the particular movement your friend made to indicate her 
choice). Actions at the top of the hierarchy are more readily imitated and, according to the 
ideomotor principle, the selected goal activates the motor programme most readily associated 
with it (Prinz, 1990). GOADI is largely supported by studies which have characterised 
people’s errors and movements during imitation tasks. These show both that children are 
primarily concerned with copying the goal of an observed action (e.g. touch ear) and that they 
are less concerned about the kinematics of the action (e.g. touch ear with a crosslateral 
movement) (Bekkering et al., 2000). Similarly, studies which have recorded participants’ 
kinematics during imitation tasks show that when goals are present participants do not copy 
the speed of the model’s action, but are more likely to do so when the goals are absent (Wild, 
Poliakoff, Jerrison, & Gowen, 2010, 2012). 
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In line with this, studies of mimetic desire show that people tend to choose the same 
item as others (Lebreton, Kawa, Forgeot d’Arc, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012), and tend to 
like things that others like (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010). Together these findings 
suggest that imitation behaviour is driven by the goal of an action, and that kinematic 
information is often ignored.  One goal of the present study was to test if this is true in a rich 
virtual reality context. 
This focus on goals during imitation is particularly the case for autistic individuals 
who tend to copy the goal of an action but not the style with which the goal was achieved 
(Forbes, Pan, & Hamilton, 2016; Hobson & Lee, 1999), and, show increased goal-directed 
eye movements during imitation tasks (Wild et al., 2012). This inclination towards goal-
directed imitation in autism is explored further in Experiment 2.  
Imitating anatomically vs. imitating spatially  
When imitating other people we can copy the topography of their action (match their 
movement anatomically), or, we can match their movement spatially (make a movement to 
the same spatial location). When there is a topographical matching between the movement of 
a model and that of an imitator, imitation is enhanced. For example, Brass et al. (Brass, 
Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001) showed that participants are faster at imitating finger movements 
when the observed hand is presented in the same configuration as their own. Similarly, 
Ramenzoni, Sebanz and Knoblich (Ramenzoni, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2015) found that the 
ability to tap synchronously with a model was modulated by the topographical congruency 
between the model and participants’ hands. Automatic imitation effects are also strongest 
when they are effector-specific; for example, participants are faster to make hand opening 
movements having observed hand opening compared to mouth opening (Leighton & Heyes, 
2010).  Pan and Hamilton (2015) found that participants showed a greater tendency to copy 
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another agent when they could map the actions of another agent onto their own body. They 
asked participants to perform simple tapping sequences with three drums which were either 
the same (congruent) or different (incongruent) from the sequences performed by a virtual 
character or a bouncing ball. There was either a spatial or anatomical matching between the 
drums of the virtual character (or ball) and those of the participant. In the spatial condition, 
the participants displayed no imitative advantage for the virtual character compared to the 
ball. It was only in the anatomical condition - when there was a topographical match between 
participants and virtual character - that participants showed an imitative advantage for the 
virtual character. These studies demonstrate that imitative tendencies are enhanced when 
there is a topographical matching between the movements of the model and that of the 
imitator. The current study investigated whether people’s tendency to match the movements 
of another agent topographically could influence their choices.  
Communicative kinematics  
The fact that we change our movements according to the social context was noticed 
by Darwin who highlighted how we often “wish to make certain gestures conspicuous or 
demonstrative” (Darwin, 1872). The advent of motion tracking technologies has provided us 
with a detailed understanding of these differences (Krishnan-Barman, Forbes, & Hamilton, 
2017). Peeters et al. (2013) showed that, when participants had a communicative intent, the 
duration of their pointing movement was longer as was the time they spent at the apex of the 
point  (Peeters, Chu, Holler, Özyürek, & Hagoort, 2013). Similarly, Cleret de Langavant et al. 
(2011b) showed that the trajectory and endpoint variability of pointing movements changed 
depending on whether social context was communicative or not.  These findings are 
consistent with a range of studies which have demonstrated that the kinematic features of 
other people’s movements can reveal a wealth of information about their psychological states 
(Becchio, Koul, Ansuini, Bertone, & Cavallo, 2017; Krishnan-Barman et al., 2017). For 
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example, actors who intend to cooperate will move with a slower and exaggerated trajectory 
(Quesque, Delevoye-Turrell, & Coello, 2015; Vesper, Schmitz, Safra, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 
2016) and when participants observe another agent make a movement more quickly, they rate 
their decision as more confident (Patel, Fleming, & Kilner, 2012). In sum, when we are in the 
presence of people we often change the kinematics of our movements in order to 
communicative with them. For example, to return to our restaurant example, your friend may 
want to draw the waiter’s attention to her choice so points at the menu with a slow and 
exaggerated movement trajectory. What remains unknown however is the extent to which 
these differences in kinematics influence people’s tendency to copy other’s movements 
(Experiment 1), and, whether there are any differences in this behaviour in autistic 
individuals (Experiment 2) who may show differences in their sensitivity to social cues and 
the subsequent modulation of their imitative responses (Wang & Hamilton, 2012) 
The current study: Experiment 1 
Knowledge of other people’s choices (without any observation of their action) can 
influence our own choices (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma & Adolphs, 2013). The 
aim of Experiment 1 was to test if this effect varies when more detailed information is 
available about the kinematics of the other person’s action.  A review of previous studies of 
imitation behaviour highlights three key findings which can lead to predictions for our task: 
(1) when instructed to copy a model’s action participants tend to copy the goal ahead of the 
kinematics (Wohlschläger et al., 2003).  This aligns with social influence models which 
suggest that people tend to like things that others like (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; 
Izuma & Adolphs, 2013). 
(2) during imitation if there is a topographical (i.e. anatomical) match between the observed 
and executed movement, imitation is enhanced (Pan & Hamilton, 2015). 
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(3) when we aim to communicate with others we modulate the kinematic features of our 
actions (Peeters et al., 2013).  
Experiment 1 aimed to explore imitation and social influence in an ecologically valid, 
virtual reality setting. Many previous studies of imitation have usually involved just one goal 
(e.g. touch ear; Bekkering et al., 2000) or no goal at all (Wild et al., 2010). These studies 
have found that when a goal is present we prioritise copying the goal of the action rather than 
the type of movement made to achieve the goal (Bekkering et al., 2000; Wohlschläger et al., 
2003). If no goal is present in the observed action, we pay more attention to the type of 
movement made and imitate this more reliably. But what happens when we have a choice of 
goals as is common in many everyday situations, such as in a restaurant (Gattis, 2002)? Do 
we still copy the observed goal at the expense of the movement, or, does the type of 
movement influence our movements and our choices?  
To test this, participants were shown pairs of art pictures and indicated which one 
they preferred. They then entered a virtual art gallery and saw the same pictures pairs in the 
presence of a virtual character who sat opposite them. In the art gallery, the virtual character 
pointed to the picture she preferred before the participant indicated their preference. In the art 
gallery there were two conditions (Figure 2). In the spatial condition, there was a spatial 
correspondence between the picture pairs of the virtual character and those of the participant 
so choosing the same picture as the virtual character meant making a different movement to 
her. In the anatomical condition, there was an anatomical correspondence between the picture 
pairs of the participants and those of the virtual character so choosing the same picture meant 
making the same movement.  
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The primary aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether seeing the choices of the virtual 
character could change the choices participants had made in private. We can contrast two 
main hypotheses: 
Goal hypothesis – if participants copy the virtual character’s goal (i.e. her choice of 
picture), then in both the anatomical and spatial conditions participants should shift their 
choices to match those of the virtual character (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; 
Wohlschläger et al., 2003).  
Movement hypothesis – if participants copy the virtual character’s movements, then in 
the anatomical condition participants should shift their preferences towards those of the 
virtual character as making the same movement as the virtual character involved making the 
same choice as her. Whereas, in the spatial condition, participants should shift their 
preferences away from those of the virtual character as making the same movement as the 
virtual character involved making a different choice to her (Figure 2).  
The second aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether the kinematic properties of the 
virtual character’s pointing movements, specifically the height of her point trajectory, could 
also influence people’s movements and choices. If the virtual character pointed with an 
exaggeratedly high trajectory, which has been shown to be communicative (Peeters et al., 
2013), would participants be more likely to copy the goal of the observed action (i.e. the 






Design and participants 
The study followed a 2 x 2 design with configuration (anatomical vs. spatial) and 
height (high vs. low) as within-subject factors. The dependent variable was shift – how much 
participants shifted their preference either towards or away from those of the virtual character 
from the private to the social setting. 
39 participants (25 female) with a mean age of 29 years (SD = 10 years; range 18-59) 
were recruited from the UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience participant database. We 
aimed for a sample of 40 participants to be at the upper end of previous imitation studies 
which typically used 30-40 participants (e.g. Pan & Hamilton, 2015). One participant failed 
to turn up on the last testing day resulting in the final sample size. All participants were right-
handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no history of neurological 
disorder. All were financially reimbursed for their time and gave written informed consent 
before participating. All procedures were approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee. 
Materials 
80 picture pairs in total were selected from a sample of 240 images (120 landscape 
and 120 abstract) which were rated by an independent group of 20 participants on their 
complexity, concreteness, attractiveness, valence, affectivity and interest using a 7-point 
scale. The luminance and contrast were also calculated for each image using MATLAB 
(MathsWorks, Natick, USA). The best matched 40 landscape pictures and the best matched 
40 abstract pictures were then selected for the current study. A landscape picture always 
appeared with another landscape picture and an abstract picture always appeared with another 
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abstract picture. All 80 picture pairs (40 landscape pairs, 40 abstract pairs) were presented in 
the private setting. In the social setting 40 of these were presented in the anatomical condition 
and 40 in the spatial condition. The same pictures always appeared in the anatomical and 
spatial conditions for all participants. In both the spatial and anatomical condition, the virtual 
character pointed with a high trajectory to indicate her preference on 20 trials and with a low 
trajectory on the other 20 trials. The landscape and abstract pictures pairs were distributed 
evenly across all the conditions. 
The virtual character’s movements were animated using pre-recorded motion capture 
data from a female actor using three magnetic markers (Polhemus LIBERTY system, 
Colchester, USA) attached to the head, the top of spine, and right index finger. When 
recording the movements, the actor was instructed to look from side-to-side before pointing 
with either a high or low movement trajectory (peak height of approximately 16 cm or 2 cm, 
respectively). The motion capture data was mapped on to the virtual character using 
MotionBuilder (http://www.autodesk.com/motionbuilder) and Vizard (WorldViz Inc, Santa 
Barbara, USA).  
Procedure  
Private setting. 
In the private setting participants sat in front of a 61 cm monitor and saw each picture 
pair for 5 seconds before the picture pairs disappeared. A question then appeared which said 
“Which picture do you prefer?” and participants had 2 seconds to indicate their preference by 
pressing the ‘a’ key on a keyboard if they preferred the picture on the left of the screen or the 
‘l’ key for the picture on the right of the screen. A fixation cross appeared for 500 ms before 
the next picture pair appeared (see Figure 1). Responses were recorded in MATLAB and 
picture presentation was controlled using the Cogent toolbox 
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(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). Each picture was presented on an 11.5 cm x 11.5 
cm area with any excess spaced filled black (see Figure 1). 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
Social setting. 
After making their choices in the private setting participants made the same choices in 
the social setting - the virtual art gallery. Participants sat at a table on a stool and had a 
magnetic marker (Polhemus LIBERTY system, Colchester, USA) attached to their right 
index finger to record their movements. The virtual environment was presented on a 160 cm 
x 90 cm projector screen approximately 70 cm away from the participant using Vizard 
(WorldViz Inc, Santa Barbara, USA). The virtual environment depicted a female virtual 
character in the middle of the screen facing the participants.  The virtual character’s pictures 
were on the table in front of her and appeared on 25 cm x 25 cm placeholders. There were 
labels below the placeholders on the table with an ‘A’ or ‘B’ on a white tile below them. The 
participants’ pictures were suspended to the left and right of the virtual character in 33 cm x 
33 cm placeholders (see Figure 2).  
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
 The table which the participants sat at had three white markers: a resting pad labelled 
‘X’ in immediately in front of the participant, 20 cm in front of the participants and 40 cm to 
the left and right were white markers labelled ‘A’ and ‘B.’ If participants moved the magnetic 
marker on their right index finger onto either label on the table then the corresponding label 
under their pictures on the projector screen were highlighted with a yellow border (see 
Supplementary Video). 
The start of each trial was signalled by a beep with the virtual character’s and 
participant’s right index finger in their respective resting positions. The virtual character’s 
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pictures pairs appeared on the table in front of the virtual character and the participant’s 
pictures in the place holders either side of her. The pictures stayed on the screen for 6500 ms 
during which the participants were instructed to decide which picture they preferred but not 
to move their finger from the resting position. The virtual character also looked at the pictures 
as if she were deciding which picture she preferred. After 6500 ms all the pictures 
disappeared and a “ding” sound occurred which acted as the virtual character’s cue to move. 
The virtual character then pointed to either the ‘A’ or ‘B’ label on the table to indicate her 
preference. The label the virtual character pointed to was highlighted with a yellow border 
and she returned her finger to the resting position. 1500 ms after the “ding” sound, a “dong” 
sound occurred which acted as the participant’s cue to indicate their preference by using their 
right index finger to point to either the ‘A’ or ‘B’ on the table in front of them. Once they had 
pointed, their A or B label on the screen was also highlighted with a yellow border to indicate 
their preference. The participant then returned their right index finger to the resting position. 
After the “dong” sound, participants had 3000 ms to respond before the beep signalled the 
start of the next trial and the next picture pair appeared (see the Supplementary Video for 
examples of the trial structure).   
The participants completed two blocks in the social setting - one anatomical block and 
one spatial. The order of these was counterbalanced across participants. Participant were 
given 8 practice trials at the start of the experiment. This was always in the condition they 
encountered in the first block. At the start of the second block, the participants completed two 
or three practice trials in the new condition so that they were made aware of the difference in 
layout of the virtual character’s pictures. However, their task remained the same in both the 
anatomical and spatial condition - if they preferred picture A they pointed to ‘A’ to their left 
on the table in front of them whereas if they preferred picture B they pointed to the B on their 
right on the table in front of them (See Figure 2).  
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At the end of the experiment participants were asked to indicate how interested they 
were in art on a 7-point Likert scale and to indicate the number of times they had attended an 
art gallery or exhibition in the past 12 months.  
RESULTS 
Excluded data 
Failure to choose in the private task. 
In the private setting, participants had 2 seconds to indicate which picture they 
preferred after having viewed the pictures for 5 seconds. However, on 5.0% (SD: 5.5%) of 
trials participants did not respond quickly enough so their preference could not be recorded 
(note we addressed this issue in Experiment 2). These trials were excluded from the analysis 
as it was not possible to establish whether participants later shifted their responses on these 
trials in the social setting. There were no significant differences in the number of these ‘timed 
out’ trials in the picture pairs which later appeared in the anatomical, 4.7% (4.9%), and 
spatial, 5.4% (6.8%), conditions.  
Failure to choose in the social task. 
On 2.5% (3.3%) of trials participants failed to indicate their choice in the social task. 
These trials were excluded from the analysis. These ‘no choice’ trials were identified by 
plotting the kinematic data for each participant for each trial and identifying trials in which 
no clear pointing movement was made during the 3000 ms response period. There were no 
significant differences in the number of trials excluded for the anatomical, 2.9% (5.5%), and 
the spatial, 2.0% (2.9%), condition.  
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By combining both these exclusion criteria a total of 7.3% (6.8%) of trials were 
excluded. There were no significant differences in the total number of trials excluded for the 
anatomical, 7.5% (8.1%), and the spatial, 7.1% (7.3%), conditions.  
Preference analysis 
Agreement with the virtual character’s pre-specified choices: potential to shift. 
The virtual character’s choices were pre-specified. She made the same choice and 
movement for every participant for every picture pair. This is the advantage of using virtual 
characters as they behave consistently across participants (Pan & Hamilton, 2018). However, 
it was possible that in the private setting participants’ choices may have coincidently matched 
a large percentage of the virtual character’s pre-specified choices. For example, if participants 
matched the pre-specified choices of the virtual character on 100% of trials in the private 
setting, then it would not have been possible for them to shift their preferences towards those 
of the virtual character in the social setting (as they already agreed with all of her choices). 
Similarly, if participants did not match any of the virtual character’s pre-specified choices in 
the private setting, this would have given the participants more potential to shift their 
preferences towards those of the virtual character in the social setting. 
However, this was not the case - participants matched the pre-specified choices of the 
virtual character between (min) 39.9% and (max) 61.1% in the private setting (M = 49.3%, 
SD = 5.38%) and this did not differ between the picture pairs which would later appear in the 
anatomical (M = 49.5%, SD = 7.22%) and spatial (M = 49.2%, SD = 7.17%) conditions. 
Thus, participants had the potential to shift their preferences on approximately 40-60% of 
trials in the social setting. In the social setting participants matched the pre-specified choices 
of the virtual character between (min) 39.4% and (max) 66.4% (M = 49.3%, SD = 6.09%) 
(t38 = -0.087, p = 0.931, d = -0.013). Therefore, the overall extent to which participants 
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matched the choices of the virtual character in the social setting did not change from the 
private setting (although differences were found between the different conditions, see below). 
Shift in choice 
Consistency.  
The consistency of participants’ choices for each picture pair were compared between 
the private and social setting. On average in the social setting participants stuck with their 
choice from the private setting on 78.1% (SD = 11.2%) of trials. Greater consistency in 
participants’ choices was significantly correlated with the number of times they reported 
visiting an art gallery in the past 12 months r(37) = 0.400, p = 0.012, but was not 
significantly correlated with self-reported interest in art, r(37) = 0.285, p = 0.079. Mean (SD) 
number of gallery visits in the last 12 months was 5.46 (3.54) and participants’ mean (SD) 
self-reported interest in art (on a 1-7 point Likert scale) was 5.23 (1.35). 
Preference shift. 
On 21.9% of trials participants changed their picture choice from the private to the 
social setting. Next we investigated whether this preference shifting varied across conditions 
and if participants shifted their preferences towards or away from the preferences of the 
virtual character.  If participants made the same choice in the private setting compared to the 
social setting, then this trial was assigned a 0. If participants changed their preference in the 
social setting so that they chose the same picture as the virtual character, the trial was 
assigned a +1. Finally, if participants changed their choice in the social setting so that they 
chose the different picture to the virtual character, the trial was assigned a -1.  
The scores in each condition (anatomical-high, anatomical-low, spatial-high, and 
spatial-low) were then summed, divided by the number of valid trials in that condition and 
then multiplied by 100 to give a shift score as a percentage for each participant. Each shift 
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score could therefore range from -100% to 100% with negative scores indicating a shift away 
from the choices of the virtual character and a positive score indicating a shift towards the 
choices of the virtual character. 
A 2 (configuration: anatomical vs. spatial) x 2 (height: high vs. low) within-subjects 
ANOVA was conducted on the shift scores. This revealed a main effect of configuration 
(F1,38 = 4.27 , p = 0.046 , ηp2 = 0.101) with participants shifting towards the virtual character’s 
preferences in the anatomical condition (M = 1.79%, SD = 8.27%) and away from the virtual 
character’s preferences in the spatial condition (M = -1.74%, SD = 6.69%). The main effect 
of height was not significant (F1,38 = 1.51 , p = 0.226 , ηp2 = 0.038). However, the interaction 
between configuration and height was significant (F1,38 = 4.84 , p = 0.034 , ηp2 = 0.113).  
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
Post-hoc paired samples t-test revealed that in the high condition shift scores in the 
anatomical (M = 2.70%, SD = 11.7%) configuration were significantly greater than the shift 
scores in the spatial (M = -4.79%, SD = 8.26%) configuration (t38 = 3.20, p = 0.003, d = 
0.512). However, there was no significant difference between shift scores in the anatomical 
(M = 0.886%, SD = 11.8%) and spatial (M = 1.31%, SD = 11.3%) configuration in the low 
condition (t38 = -0.161, p = 0.873, d = -0.026) (See Figure 3).  
RESULTS SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
When given a choice of goals (e.g. picture A or picture B), do participants copy the 
choice of another agent (goal hypothesis) or do they copy the type of movement made by the 
other agent (movement hypothesis)? This was the primary question tested by Experiment 1. 
We found that participants’ tendency to make the same (topographical) movement as a virtual 
character resulted in a change in the choices they had previously made in private thus 
supporting the movement hypothesis. In the anatomical condition, participants shifted their 
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choices towards those of the virtual character as making the same movement as the virtual 
character meant making the same choice as her. In the spatial condition, participants shifted 
their choices away from those of the virtual character as making the same movement as the 
virtual character meant making a different choice to her.  This supports the movement 
hypothesis rather than the goal hypothesis. 
Do the kinematic properties of another agent’s movement, specifically the height of 
their point trajectory, influence people’s tendency to copy their movements and choices? This 
was the second question tested in Experiment 1. We found that participants’ tendency to 
imitate the type of movement made by the virtual character was driven by the observation of 
pointing movements with a high trajectory. Together these results suggest that our choices are 
not only influenced by other people’s choices but also the types of movements others make to 
indicate those choices.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 1 participants copied the movements of the virtual character and this 
changed the choices they had previously made in private. This tendency to imitate the virtual 
character’s movements was modulated by the kinematic features of her movement - 
participants copied the movement of the virtual character more when she pointed with a high, 
but not a low, trajectory. People who receive a diagnosis of autism spectrum conditions (from 
herein autism) show differences in their everyday social behaviours (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). There has been a long debate whether autistic people show differences in 
their copying behaviours (Dapretto et al., 2006; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008). The aim of 
Experiment 2 was to replicate Experiment 1 with a sample of autistic participants and a 
matched neurotypical sample to explore these potential differences.  First, we briefly review 
studies of imitation in autism to motivate our hypotheses. 
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Goal-directed imitation in autism  
Studies investigating social influence suggest that the basic mechanisms of social 
influence are intact in autism, for example, autistic participants rate objects which are the 
goal of someone’s action as more desirable than objects which are not the goal of their action 
(Forgeot D’Arc et al., 2016). This focus on other’s goals in autism is supported by the 
imitation literature.  Autistic people are more goal-focused when copying others but imitate 
the means with which a goal was achieved to a lesser extent than non-autistic people. For 
example, Hamilton, Brindley and Frith ( Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007) used the ear 
touching paradigm (Bekkering et al., 2000) to show that autistic children made the same 
types of errors and at the same frequency as their non-autistic peers suggesting intact goal-
directed imitation in autism. Moreover, Hobson & Lee (1999) found that autistic participants 
were proficient in copying goal-directed actions, but tended not to copy the style with which 
the experimenter executed those actions. Similarly, Wild et al. (2012) showed that whilst 
non-autistic adults’ own movements were sensitive to the movement speed of another agent’s 
pointing movements, autistic adults’ movements were not modulated by the agent’s 
movement speed. Autistic participants also displayed more goal-directed eye-movements 
(Wild et al., 2012). These findings were supported by Forbes, Pan and Hamilton (Forbes et 
al., 2016) who showed that autistic and neurotypical participants showed no differences in 
their ability to copy the goal of a virtual character’s action, but autistic participants copied the 
kinematics of her action to a lesser extent. These results in adults are consistent with the 
developmental literature which show that autistic children do not overimitate (Marsh, 
Pearson, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2013).  
However, what happens to goal-directed imitation when autistic participants have a 
choice of goals as was the case in our current paradigm? If there is a focus on goals during 
imitation, rather than the types of movements made, then autistic participants should copy the 
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goal of the virtual character’s action. Thus, we predicted there would be comparable shifts in 
their preferences (or lack thereof) in both the anatomical and spatial conditions. This was the 
first hypothesis tested in Experiment 2.  
Social cues and imitation in autism 
In Experiment 1 we found that participants copied the type of movement made by the 
virtual character more when she pointed with a high, compared to a low, movement 
trajectory. This maps on to a theory of mimicry, the social-top down response modulation 
(STORM) model, which states that people change their mimicry (i.e. their unconscious 
imitation) depending on social cues (Yin Wang & Hamilton, 2012). For example, eye-contact 
(Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011) and emotional facial expressions (Rauchbauer, 
Majdandžić, Hummer, Windischberger, & Lamm, 2015) have all been shown to enhance 
mimicry responses.   
Movements with a high or exaggerated movement trajectory may also function as 
social cues (Forbes & Hamilton, 2017; Gergely & Csibra, 2003).  They are produced in 
contexts where people intend to send a social signal of cooperation (Vesper, Schmitz, Safra, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016), and observation of high trajectories activates ‘mentalising’ areas 
of the brain (Marsh, Mullett, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2014) . Similarly, caregivers often 
exaggerate components of an action sequence when interacting with an infant (Brand, 
Baldwin, & Ashburn, 2002) and it has been suggested that this “motionese” may help infants 
to establish what to imitate (Nagai & Rohlfing, 2007).  Based on the results of Experiment 1, 
we suggest that the height of the movement performed by the virtual character acts as a social 
cue, in this case signalling ‘this one is important’.  If neurotypical participants perceive and 
act on this social cue, this could drive their imitation of the virtual character. 
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Interpreting the results of Experiment 1 within the STORM model also leads to 
specific predictions for the performance of autistic participants.  STORM predicts that there 
is less modulation of imitation by social cues in participants with autism. For example, eye-
gaze (Forbes, Wang, & Hamilton, 2017; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014), prosocial priming 
(Cook & Bird, 2012), and emotional facial expressions (Grecucci et al., 2013) enhance 
imitative tendencies in non-autistic participants but not in autistic participants. Thus, 
according to STORM, autistic participants should not change their imitation behaviour based 
on the height of the virtual character’s pointing movement as was found in Experiment 1. 
This was the second hypothesis we aimed to test in Experiment 2. 
METHOD 
Changes from Experiment 1 
Methods for Experiment 1 were the same as Experiment 2 apart from the following 
changes: 
Private task.  
After the presentation of the pictures the question “Which picture do you prefer?” 
stayed on the screen until participants indicated their preference by pressing the appropriate 
key on the keyboard. This was done to prevent a loss of trials due to the participants not 
responding quickly enough as occurred in Experiment 1.  
Design. 
A between-subject factor, Group (neurotypical vs. autism), was added to the 2 




29 neurotypical and 27 autistic participants were recruited through the autism@icn 
participant database and came to the university as part of a research day during which they 
took part in multiple studies. We aimed for a sample of at least 25 participants in each group. 
The final sample size was determined by the availability of participants on the database 
during the testing period. Data analysis was not conducted until the end of data collection. 
Groups were matched on age, gender, handedness, and, verbal and performance IQ using 
either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III UK; Wechsler 1999a) or Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II, Wechsler 1999b; Table 1). All autistic 
participants had a diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder from an independent clinician: 20 
participants had a diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome and 7 participants had a diagnosis of 
autism spectrum disorder. Autistic participants were also tested on module 4 of the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-G Lord et al. 2000) or ADOS-2 (Lord et al. 2012) 
by a trained researcher with research-reliability status: ten met the ADOS classification for 
autism, ten for autism spectrum, and, seven did not meet the classification of autism or autism 
spectrum. However, all seven who did not meet the cut off for an overall classification of 
autism or autism spectrum, reached the ADOS cut-off for autism spectrum on either the 
communication or reciprocal social interaction subscale. Five autistic participants had 
additional diagnoses: dyslexia (1), dyspraxia (1), or ADHD (2), and, one participant had 
additional diagnoses of both ADHD and dyspraxia. All participants were financially 
reimbursed for their time and gave written informed consent to participate.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
RESULTS  
Excluded data 
Failure to choose in the social task. 
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If participants failed to indicate their choice during the social task these trials were 
excluded from the analysis. This occurred on 1.38 % (2.07%) of trials for neurotypical 
participants and 2.36% (2.95%) for the autistic participants. There were no significant 
differences between the number of excluded trials between the groups (t54 = -1.45, p = .16, d 
= 0.38). 
Shift in choice 
Consistency.  
In the social setting neurotypical participants stuck with their choice from the private 
setting on 76.72% (7.78%) of trials and autistic participants stuck with their choice on 
58.81% (6.08%) of trials. An independent samples t-test revealed that neurotypical 
participants were more consistent in their choices than autistic participants, t54 = -9.55, p < 
.001, d = 2.63. Autistic participants reported having visited art galleries less often in the past 
12 months (see Table 2) and Experiment 1 found that gallery visits was significantly 
correlated with consistency. Thus, we conducted a multiple linear regression to explore 
whether consistency was better predicted by reduced art experience or an autism diagnosis. 
The model explained 62.9% of the variability in consistency, R2 = .63, F2,53 = 44.84, p < .001.  
When holding the number of art visits in the past 12 months constant, group significantly 
predicted consistency, β = .79, t53 = 8.96, p < .001.  When controlling for group, art visits did 
not significantly predict consistency, β = -.02, t53 = -0.28, p = .78. 
Preference shift. 
Shift was calculated as in Experiment 1. A one sample t-test (t55 = 0.182, p = 0.856) 
revealed that mean shift scores did not differ significantly from 0 showing that overall 
participants did not shift their choices towards or away from those of the virtual character 
from the private to the social setting. To explore differences across the conditions we 
 24 
 
conducted a 2 (configuration: anatomical vs. spatial) x 2 (height: high vs. low) within-
subjects ANOVA on the shift scores. We first report the ANOVAs for each group separately, 
before reporting the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with group (neurotypical vs. autism) as a between-
subject factor.  
Neurotypical. 
Neurotypical participants displayed a main effect of configuration (F1,28 = 7.82, p = 
0.009, ηp2 = 0.218) with mean shift scores greater in the anatomical condition, 1.75% (SD = 
6.33%), compared to the spatial condition, -2.89% (SD = 7.32%) (see Figure 4). The main 
effect of height (F1,28 = 1.76, p = 0.195, ηp2 = 0.059) and the interaction between 
configuration and height were not significant (F1,28 = .371, p = 0.548, ηp2 = 0.013).  
Autism. 
 Autistic participants did not display a main effect of configuration (F1,26 = .957, p = 
.337, ηp2 = .036) or height (F1,26 = .429, p = .518, ηp2 = .016) and there was no significant 
interaction between configuration and height (F1,26 = .001, p = .976, ηp2 < .001).  
Group comparison.  
 By including group as a between-subject factor, this revealed a main effect of 
configuration (F1,54 = 6.69, p = .012, ηp2 = .110) with mean shift scores greater in the 
anatomical condition, 1.79% (SD = 6.78%), compared to the spatial condition, -1.50% (SD = 
7.04%). No other main effects or interactions were significant.  
RESULT SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings from Experiment 1 and explore any 
differences in autistic participants. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 by demonstrating 
that participants’ tendency to make the same (topographical) movement as a virtual character 
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resulted in a change in the choices they had previously made in private. This suggests that 
when given a choice of goals participants are more likely to copy the type of movement made 
by another agent rather than the action goal. In the anatomical condition participants shifted 
their preferences towards those of the virtual character as making the same movement as the 
virtual character also meant making the same choice as her. In the spatial condition 
participants shifted their preferences away from those of the virtual character as making the 
same movement as the virtual character meant making a different choice to her. When we 
controlled for copresence - the extent to which participants felt immersed in the virtual social 
interaction - we replicated the second finding from Experiment 1 - the tendency to make the 
same movement as the virtual character was driven by the observation of pointing 
movements with a high trajectory. Finally, we found no evidence of any significant 
differences in the autism sample, except that autistic participants were less consistent in their 
choices between the private and social setting.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across two studies and 95 participants, we demonstrated that participants showed a 
consistent tendency to copy the (topographical) movements made by a virtual character rather 
than the goal of her action. This resulted in a change in the choices participants had 
previously made in private. In the anatomical condition, participants shifted their preferences 
towards those of the virtual character as making the same movement as the virtual character 
meant making the same choice as her. In the spatial condition, participants shifted their 
preferences away from those of the virtual character as making the same movement as the 
virtual character meant making a different choice to her. In Experiment 1, we showed that 
this tendency to copy the virtual character’s movements was modulated by the kinematics of 
her pointing trajectory - participants copied her movements more when she pointed with a 
high, but not a low, trajectory. But this effect of height may be fragile as we did not replicate 
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it in Experiment 2. The results of the autistic participants were ambiguous: unlike 
neurotypical participant, autistic participants did not display a main effect of configuration. 
However, we did not find any significant group differences in the imitation behaviour. 
 The results suggest that when we have a choice of goals, as is common in many 
everyday social situations, imitation may be driven by others’ movements rather than their 
action goals. More generally, these findings suggest that when we make choices in the 
presence of others, our choices are not only influenced by other people’s choices but also the 
types of movement others make to indicate their choices. We discuss our findings in terms of 
theories of imitation.  
Copying topographical movements rather than action goals 
 In contrast to many studies investigating imitation, the current study gave participants 
a choice of goal (e.g. picture A or picture B). Arguably, this is much more akin to how 
imitation operates in everyday social interactions. For example, at a restaurant you are not 
obliged to copy the choice of your friend - you have a choice. Theories of imitation, such as 
GOADI (Wohlschläger et al., 2003), have mainly been tested under conditions where there is 
a clear, unambiguous goal or no goal at all (Bekkering et al., 2000; Wild et al., 2010, 2012). 
When the goal is clear, participants prioritise imitating the goal at the expense of the way in 
which the goal was achieved, such as the particular movement made to point to a target. Our 
findings suggest, however, that when the imitator has a choice of goal, the types of 
movements others make to indicate their choices plays a more important role in imitation.  
We showed that participants show an imitative advantage when there is a 
topographical (i.e. anatomical) matching between the movement of a model and that of an 
imitator. Here, the participants can map the actions of another agent onto their own body 
(Tsakiris, 2010). This supports previous work comparing anatomical and spatial imitation 
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(Pan & Hamilton, 2015; Ramenzoni et al., 2015). Both Pan and Hamilton (2015) and 
Ramenzoni et al. (2015) used reaction time measures of imitation - the time taken to tap the 
first drum in a sequence and tapping asynchrony, respectively. The present findings build on 
this work by showing that participants made the same anatomical movement as another agent 
with a greater frequency. This imitative advantage seen for anatomical movements can be 
explained by associative accounts of imitation, such as Heyes’ associative sequence learning 
(ASL) account  (Heyes, 2011). 
According to Heyes, when we consistently observe an action and perform an action 
contingently, overtime, the connections between the visual representation and motor 
representation involved in observing and performing this action become strengthened. Thus, 
if we observe a particular action, we are primed to make a movement which has been 
associated with that action. In terms of the current paradigm, ASL rests on the assumption 
that we have greater experience of observing and executing anatomically matched pointing 
movements rather than those matched spatially. Thus, following the observation of a pointing 
movement we are primed to make a pointing movement which matches this movement 
anatomically. Gillmeister et al. (2008) showed that through sensorimotor training it is 
possible to change these anatomically matched associations (Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, 
Brass, & Heyes, 2008). Thus, future studies using the current paradigm could train 
participants to observe and execute spatially matched, rather than anatomically matched, 
pointing movements to see if this alters participants’ preference shifts. 
Our findings fit with the literature on cross-contextual imitation where participants 
imitate an observed movement (e.g. lifting) even then the model has a different goal (e.g. 
lifting barbell) to that of the participant (e.g. lifting a cup for drinking) (Genschow & Florack, 
2014; Genschow, Florack, & Wänke, 2013). Together with our findings, this suggests that 
copying the goal of an action may not be always be a necessary precondition for imitation. 
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Interesting, cross-contextual imitation is modulated by social cues, such as group 
membership (Genschow & Schindler, 2016), so it would be of interest to explore these 
moderators in our paradigm.  
Modulating imitation through actor kinematics  
Experiment 1 showed that participants were more likely to imitate the anatomical rather 
than spatial movement of the virtual character if she pointed with a high, but not a low, 
trajectory. Thus, participants’ propensity to imitate the virtual character was modulated by the 
kinematics of her pointing movement. This is in line with Wang and Hamilton’s (2012) 
model of mimicry, STORM, which predicted that all mimicry is subject to top-down 
modulation by a range of social cues (Wang & Hamilton, 2012).  Our data shows that high or 
exaggerated movement trajectories, which have a communicative function (Cleret de 
Langavant et al., 2011; Peeters et al., 2013), appear to modulate imitative tendencies in a 
similar way to other social cues, such as eye-gaze (Forbes & Hamilton, 2017; Wang, Ramsey, 
& Hamilton, 2011), social priming (Cook & Bird, 2012), and emotional facial expressions 
(Grecucci et al., 2013). This is supported by neuroimaging studies which show that high 
movement trajectories preferentially activate the brain’s mentalising system, such as medial 
prefrontal cortex (Marsh et al., 2014). This same region has been implicated in controlling the 
social modulation of mimicry by direct gaze (Wang, Ramsey, & Hamilton, 2011). Thus, high 
movement trajectories may modulate imitative tendencies via the same neurocognitive 
mechanism as other social cues, such as direct gaze. Future neuroimaging studies are needed 
to confirm this. 
While the current study manipulated the height of the pointing movement, other 
kinematic features of pointing movements could modulate imitation in a similar way. For 
example, Patel et al. (2012) showed that when participants observed another agent make a 
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movement more quickly, then they rated their decision as more confident. Thus, future work 
should explore whether pointing movements with certain velocities are more readily imitated. 
Further studies are also needed to investigate the robustness of the effect of height as we did 
not replicate it in Experiment 2. 
Imitation and autism  
Experiment 2 had two hypotheses concerning the imitation behaviour of autistic 
participants. Firstly, previous work has suggested that autistic participants are more goal-
focused during imitation (Marsh et al., 2013; Wild et al., 2012). We predicted therefore that 
there would be comparable shifts in preferences (or lack thereof) in both the anatomical and 
spatial conditions for autistic participants. Autistic participants showed a smaller difference 
between configuration conditions compared to the neurotypical group and unlike the 
neurotypical group this difference was not statistically significant (Figure 4). . However, 
there were no significant differences in imitation behaviour between the groups (i.e. no 
significant configuration x group interaction). Thus, when given a choice of goals, we found 
no evidence for increased goal-directed imitation in autism. Yet, given the ambiguity of our 
results, future studies, ideally with larger sample, will be needed to confirm this. Secondly, 
we predicted that autistic participants would not change their imitation behaviour based on 
the height of the virtual character’s pointing movement, as was found in Experiment 1. As, 
according to STORM, the modulation of imitative tendencies is different in autism (Wang 
and Hamilton, 2012). Again, we found no evidence to support this prediction. Thus, the 
implications of our findings for theories of imitation in autism remain equivocal. It is 
important to note, however, that most studies which have found differences in the social 
modulation of imitation and mimicry in autism have used reaction times measures of mimicry 
(Cook & Bird, 2012; Forbes et al., 2017; Grecucci et al., 2013). It has recently been 
demonstrated that different measures of imitation and mimicry are poorly related to one 
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another (Genschow et al., 2017). So, when detecting differences in mimicry and imitation in 
autistic samples, the type of mimicry measure used may be critical. For example, a recent 
meta-analysis found no evidence of automatic imitation differences in autism (Cracco et al., 
2018).  
One unexpected finding from Experiment 2 was that autistic participant were less 
consistent in their choices between the private and social setting. Neurotypical participants 
stuck with their choices from the private setting on 78% (Experiment 1) and 77% 
(Experiment 2) of trials in the social setting. Autistic participants stuck with their choices on 
59% of trials and the analysis revealed that this reduced consistency could not be explained 
by the greater interest in art in the neurotypical group (as indexed by the number of gallery 
visits in the past 12 months). The finding that autistic participants changed their choices more 
from the private to the social setting seems at odds with one of the core features of autism - 
restricted and repetitive behaviours (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Although an 
insistence on sameness has been widely reported in autistic individuals (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), the lack of consistency in the choices of autistic participants in our task 
may be due to differences in executive functioning and attentional processing (Happé, Booth, 
Charlton, & Hughes, 2006). Moreover, increasing evidence suggests that differences in 
experimental and neuropsychological measures of cognitive flexibility are poorly related to 
everyday restricted and repetitive behaviours (Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009; Teunisse et 
al., 2012).  
Future directions  
Although participants changed some of their choices from the private to the social 
setting, it is not clear whether this resulted in an actual shift in their art preferences. For 
example, if participants chose picture A in the private setting but then chose picture B in the 
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social setting, did they actually prefer picture B? Or, alternatively, was this simply a transient 
change in choice driven by the observation of the virtual character’s movements? For 
example, participants change their ratings of music when exposed to the opinions of others 
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010) and Izuma and Adolphs (2013) found that participants 
preferences for t-shirt designs remained influenced by the opinions of others even after 4 
months. Yet, Huang, Kendrick and Yu (2014) found that people’s ratings of facial 
attractiveness were influenced by the ratings of others for up to three days but not longer than 
seven days. Thus, future work using the current paradigm will need to establish whether any 
changes in participants’ choices persist or are transient.  
Participants changed their choice on approximately one in every four or five picture 
pairs and when participants did change their choices they were influenced by the virtual 
character’s movements. However, the choices participants made in the current study did not 
have any significant consequences. Copying the movements of others has been shown to 
override strong financial incentives to avoid imitation during competitive games  (Belot, 
Crawford, Heyes, & Scheinkman, 2013; Naber, Vaziri Pashkam, & Nakayama, 2013). So, 
had participants been incentivised to be consistent in their choices between the private and 
social setting, would the influence of virtual character’s movements have had comparable 
effects on their choices? Alternatively, if participants have particularly strong preferences for  
certain types of stimuli (e.g. a choice between two foods), would we see the same effects of 
movement imitation or would preferences be a better predictor of participants’ behaviour? 
These questions remain to be tested in future studies.  
An additional avenue for future research is to increase the communicativeness of the 
task. For example, the paradigm could include gaze following so that the virtual character 
responds to the hand and/or eye movements of the participants. This will allow us to establish 
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whether the increased social engagement of the virtual character will result in differences in 
imitation behaviour (Forbes et al., 2016; Hamilton & Lind, 2016) 
Conclusion 
 Theories of imitation have stressed that we prioritise copying the goals of observed 
actions (Bekkering et al., 2000; Wohlschläger et al., 2003) and that social influences are 
driven by our observation of others’ choices  (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010). However, 
most experiments which have tested these theories have failed to include conditions in which 
participants have a choice of goal. Across two experiments we showed that when 
neurotypical participants were given a choice of goal, they tended to imitate the topographical 
movement made by a virtual character rather than her choice. There were no significant 
differences between the imitative behaviour of neurotypical and autistic participants, despite 
autistic participants showing a reduced imitation effect. In Experiment 1 we found that the 
tendency to copy the virtual character’s movements was driven by the observation of the 
virtual character’s high pointing movements, although we did not replicate this finding in 
Experiment 2. These findings tentatively support the STORM model by demonstrating that 
imitative tendencies can be modulated by subtle social cues, such as the kinematics of an 
actor’s movements (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). More generally, we show that the way others 






Figure 1. The private task trial structure. 
In Experiment 1 participants had 2 seconds to respond to indicate their preference during the 
response period. As some participants did not respond within 2 seconds in Experiment 1, this 






Figure 2. The social task setup. 
Participants sat opposite the virtual character and she pointed to indicate her preference with 
either a low (blue) or high (green) movement trajectory. In each block there was either an 
anatomical (A) or spatial (B) match between the virtual character’s pictures and those of the 
participant. Participants movements were considered an anatomical match (A) if both moved 
contralaterally (as shown in A) or if both move ipsilaterally.  In the anatomical condition (A), 
pictures were arranged so that anatomically matching movements allowed both to point to the 
same picture.  In the spatial condition, if participant made the same choice as the virtual 
character then they had to make a different movement – in this case one makes an ipsilateral 











Figure 4. Mean shift scores for the autistic and neurotypical participants in Experiment 2. 





Table 1. A comparison of the autistic and neurotypical participants 
  Neurotypical (n = 29)   Autistic (n = 27)   t test 
  Mean (SD) Range 
  
Mean (SD) Range 
  
p value 
Age (years)   31 (11) 19-61    32 (8) 20-53   0.59 
Full IQ 117 (12) 87-138   117 (14) 86-152   0.75 
Verbal IQ 117 (13) 88-147   119 (14) 91-155   0.46 
Performance IQ 113 (15) 76-146   110 (15) 80-132   0.94 
AQ 14 (7) 3-28   33 (9) 12-48   < .001 
ADOS: total - -     9 (3) 4-17   - 
ADOS: comm. - -     3 (2) 0-6   - 
ADOS: RSI - -     6 (2) 2-11   - 
Gender 20 M; 9 F -   22 M; 5 F -   - 





Table 2. A comparison of co-presence, interest in art and art gallery visits in the past 12 
months between the two groups (NT: neurotypical; ASC: autism) 
  NT (n = 29)   ASC (n = 27)   t test 
  Mean (SD)   Mean (SD)   t54 p d 
Co-presence 2.95 (1.37)   3.04 (1.45)   -0.26 .80 .06 
Art Interest 5.03 (1.30)   4.70 (1.68)   0.83 .41 .21 
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